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TERM OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT
(August 1976 - August 1977)
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A review of the 1976 Term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
in the field of civil procedure, verified past observations made
in this Review that the enactment of the new Rules of Civil
Procedure leaves a majority of the decisions of the last term
with little or no applicability to current Wisconsin practice
under the present rules of civil procedure.' Although a majority
of the cases decided during the 1976 Term by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court involved the interpretation of the Rules of Civil
Procedure as they existed prior to January 1, 1976,2 the court
in deciding cases brought under the former rules has, whenever
possible, made an attempt to comment on the possible effect
of the new rules upon the pending problem and attempted to
relate their decision to the new rules.' This article will not
discuss those cases which, because of the enactment of the new
rules, will not have a continuing influence upon the law of civil
procedure in Wisconsin, but rather emphasis will be placed on
those 1976 Term decisions which will affect and apply to present Rules of Civil Procedure. During the 1976 Term, the court
adopted several modifications of the Civil Procedure Rules.4
Most notably, the modifications concern the sixty-day service
limitation after commencement of the action pursuant to section 801.02(1).
1. Term of Court, Civil Procedure, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 379 (1977); Term of Court,
Civil Procedure,59 MARQ. L. REv. 279 (1976).
2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure
during the 1974 Term and established an effective date of Jan. 1, 1976. 67 Wis. 2d 585
(1975).
3. See, e.g., Drehmel v. Radenak, 75 Wis. 2d 223, 249 N.W.2d 274 (1977) wherein
the court upheld the trial court's refusal to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint some
eight years after the accident, five years-after the running of the statute, and two years
after service of notice of readiness for trial. Although the decision was divided on the
basis of former section 269.44 and the related case law, the court pointed out the
different approach taken by new section 802.09(3).
4. 73 Wis. 2d at xxxi (1976).
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was broad enough to include the failure to produce documents
at a discovery proceeding. Section 885.11(5) specifically provides for the granting of judgment against a party in default.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also recognized the inherent
power of a court to dismiss an action where there was a failure
to produce evidence ordered to be produced based on the necessity of maintaining judicial efficiency and the swift dispatch
of justice.
In affirming the trial court's action, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court relied upon the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, Inc.' In that decision, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a dismissal on the merits because of the plaintiffs failure to answer certain written interrogatories for a period exceeding seventeen months despite a court order compelling performance by a date certain. In its opinion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
If matters of expediting court proceedings and assuring
proper and prompt administration of justice are to be more
than mere matters on the agenda at judicial or bar association workshops, the lead of the nation's high court is to be
followed in upholding dismissals on the merits where, as the
trial court found in the National Hockey League Case, and

we see in the case before us, there has been a "callous disregard of responsibilities" owed by plaintiff and plaintiff's
counsel to the court and to the adversary parties."0
Nevertheless, the court recognized that both its prior decisions, and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
National Hockey League, required a finding of bad faith as a
basis for granting the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice.11 The repeated failure of plaintiff's counsel to comply, his
failure to seek an extension or modification of the compliance
deadline, and his late admission that the whereabouts of the
tie rod were unknown, were sufficient for the court to conclude
that plaintiff and his counsel had showed a "callous disregard
(5) Striking out pleading. If any party to an action or proceeding shall unlaw-

fully refuse or neglect to appear or testify or depose therein (either within or
without the state), the court may, also, strike out his pleading, and give judgment against him as upon default or failure of proof.
9. 427 U.S. 639 (1977).
10. 79 Wis. 2d at 267, 255 N.W.2d at 515.
11. Id. at 268, 255 N.W.2d at 515.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:279

of responsibilities" owed to the court and to the adversary parties.
Although Furreneswas decided within the framework of the
discovery statutes of the old rules of civil procedure, it is directly applicable to the present rules of discovery as set forth
in chapter 804 of the 1975 Statutes. National Hockey League,
upon which the court so heavily relied, was decided under Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 804.12(2) of
the Wisconsin Statutes, which sets forth the sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order, was directly modeled
after Rule 37.12 Section 804.12(2)(a)(3) specifically provides
that the court may make an order "striking out pleadings or
parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party."
The overall effect of the new rules of civil procedure and its
allowance of notice pleading is an increasing emphasis on discovery and discovery procedures. In Furrenes, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has served notice upon the bar that it will not
be reluctant, when faced with callous disregard by counsel, to
impose severe sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order.
In Dubman v. North Shore Bank,' 3 the court considered
whether an order imposing sanctions, other than dismissal for
failure to produce documents, in conjunction with discovery
procedures was directly appealable. The trial court had entered
an order requiring the defendant bank to produce certain documents which were alleged to be in its possession. The bank
refused to produce the requested documents. 4 The trial court
then issued an order granting several sanctions against the defendant including the establishment of certain facts, the striking of defendant's affirmative defense, and the preclusion of
the introduction of certain evidence by the defendant. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the order did not constitute a provisional remedy under section 817.33(3) since it did
not prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.
12. See Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure Chapter 804, 59
MARQ. L. REv. 465, 522 (1976).

13. 75 Wis. 2d 597, 249 N.W.2d 797 (1977).
14. The action sought damages from the bank as a secured party for failure to
exercise reasonable care to protect certain collateral (common stock) in its possession.
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Rather, the court considered such an order to be an intermediate order involving the merits and thus, necessarily affecting
the judgment, reviewable upon an appeal of an adverse judgment.15
In Karl v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,1 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court enlarged upon its earlier holding in Whanger
v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. 17with respect to the
presence of counsel at an independent medical examination of
a personal injury claimant. In Whanger, the court held that
such examinations were not adversary proceedings per se, but
rather, investigatory in nature and that generally the presence
of counsel was unnecessary and improper. However, the court
recognized that there might be instances in which because of a
particular need or prejudice, counsel should be permitted to be
present. The court held that the burden to show such circumstances fell upon the claimant, and upon such a showing, the
trial court could allow the presence of counsel.18
In Karl, plaintiff's counsel accompanied Mrs. Karl when
she submitted to the examination. Defendants moved that the
cross-examination of the examining physician by plaintiff's
counsel be limited so as not to touch upon those portions of the
examination observed and heard by counsel but not discussed
in direct examination. The trial court refused to so limit the
plaintiff's cross-examination. The plaintiffs claimed that since
the examination was by stipulation rather than pursuant to a
court order,19 the guidelines set forth in Whanger did not apply.
Relying upon its decision in Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc.,2" in
which the court found that an authorization to inspect medical
records had the same effect as an order pursuant to the statute
compelling inspection, the court rejected the argument made
by the plaintiff. Reasoning that the stipulation entered into by
the parties obviated the necessity of securing a court order and
avoided the consumption of unnecessary court time, the court
held that the guidelines set forth in Whanger were applicable
15. 75 Wis. 2d at 601, 249 N.W.2d at 799.
16. 78 Wis. 2d 284, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977).
17. 58 Wis. 2d 461, 207 N.W.2d 74 (1973).
18. Id. at 471, 207 N.W.2d at 79.
19. Wis. STAT. § 269.57(2) (1973) provided as does the present section 804.10(1),
that in an action to recover for personal injuries the court may order the party to
submit to a physical examination.
20. 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).
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to the present case.' Nevertheless, the court concluded that in
the instant case the presence of counsel was not prejudicial and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to limit
the cross-examination.
1-.

JURISDICTION

The Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt in detail with jurisdiction issues under our long-arm statute in two cases during the
1976 Term. In Fields v. Playboy Club of Lake Geneva, Inc.22 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered both the scope of section
801.05(4)(a) and the sufficiency of service under section
180.847(4). Fields was a passenger in a 1966 Spider automobile manufactured by Audi and driven by James Peyer
which was involved in a single-car accident. Fields sued Peyer,
the Playboy Club of Lake Geneva, Inc., the local dealer who
sold the car to Peyer, the regional dealer and the national importer of Audi. Peyer and the local dealer answered and crosscomplained against the German manufacturer Audi for contribution. Both cross-complaining defendants followed a similar
procedure in attempting service upon Audi. Service was made
on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 180.847(4), and
upon Volkswagen of America which was Audi's designated
agent for service of process pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1399(e) of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Audi objected to jurisdiction with respect to both cross-complaints.
Audi argued that it was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
Wisconsin courts because there were insufficient contacts by
Audi with Wisconsin to meet due process standards. In addition, Audi argued that it had not been properly served since
service upon the Secretary of State pursuant to Wisconsin
Statutes section 180.847(4) was defective since Audi was not
"transacting business" in Wisconsin and service upon Volkswagen of America was likewise insufficient because Volkswagen was Audi's designated agent for only those actions and
proceedings commenced pursuant to the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
The court found Audi amenable to the jurisdiction of the
Wisconsin courts, relying in part upon section 262.05(4)(a) of
21. 78 Wis. 2d at 295, 254 N.W.2d at 260.
22. 75 Wis. 2d 644, 250 N.W.2d 311 (1977).
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the Wisconsin Statutes, now renumbered 801.05(4)(a).2 At the
jurisdictional hearing, evidence was introduced which showed
that during the relevant time period between 1970 and 1971, 25
advertisements for Porsche and Audi (manufactured by the
same company) appeared in Time, Newsweek, Motor Trend,
and Playboy magazines. All of the above-named magazines
were widely distributed in Wisconsin. Quoting from the Kansas
decision of Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., the Wisconsin court stated:
If the defendant advertises, solicits or sells its product in
the forum state it then has or can anticipate some direct or
indirect financial benefit from the sale, trade, use or servicing
of its products in the forum state. It is then subject to in
personam jurisdiction. The particular product or service
causing the injury need not be sold or performed in the forum
state but the defendant must reasonably have or anticipate
financial benefit from the sale,
trade, use or servicing of its
24
products in the forum state.
The court also noted that there was evidence to indicate that
Illinois auto dealers had sold 41 Porsche-Audis to Wisconsin
residents during the relevant time period. The decision is unclear as to the weight which the court placed on this factor in
finding that Audi had sufficient contacts with the State of
Wisconsin. As such, the court may have relied upon section
801.05(4)(b) as well as section 801.05(4)(a) in making its decision.
Having found that Audi was amenable to in personam jurisdiction, the court next considered the issue of the sufficiency
of the service made by the two cross-complaining defendants
upon Audi. 25 Section 262.06(5)(c) of the Wisconsin Statutes,
23. Wis. STAT. § 801.05(4) (1975) provides in pertinent part:

(4) Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury to person or
property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by
the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the injury, either:
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on within this state by or
on behalf of the defendant; or
(b) Products, materials or things processd, serviced or manufactured by the •
defendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of
trade.
24. 75 Wis. 2d at 653, 250 N.W.2d at 316, citing 200 Kan. 641, 648, 438 P.2d 128
133-34 (1968).
25. The court found it unnecessary to make a separate analysis of the jurisdictional
contacts with respect to the due process standards set forth in Zerbel v. H.L. Federman
& Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970). The court found that the types of contacts
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now renumbered 801.11(5)(c), provides that service may be
made upon a domestic or foreign corporation by "serving the
summons in a manner specified by any other statute . . . or
upon an agent authorized by appointment." Section 180.847(4)
provides,
A foreign corporation transacting business in this state
without a certificate of authority, if a certificate of authority
is required under this chapter, shall by so doing be deemed
to have thereby appointed the secretary of state as its agent
and representative upon whom any process . . . may be
served in any action ....
The cross-complaining defendants argued that the
"transacting business" requirement ought to be construed so as
to be coextensive with a finding that the defendant had sufficient contacts with the state to be amenable to its jurisdiction.
Thus, a finding of proper jurisdiction would ipso facto allow
proper service of process through the office of the Secretary of
State pursuant to section 180.847(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes.
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that such a finding
would require all corporations amenable to jurisdiction to obtain a certificate of authority in this state and that such a
result, at least in one instance, was specifically abrogated by
statute. Section 180.801(4)(d)2" specifically excludes from the
definition of "transacting business" the soliciting or procuring
of orders by a foreign corporation within this state. Yet, in the
instant case, it was just such conduct which formed the basis
upon which the court concluded that Audi was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Wisconsin courts. The court thus made it
clear that the factors or conduct which were found to be sufficient to allow the proper exercise of jurisdiction were not the
same contacts or activities that would be considered in determining whether service of process pursuant to section
which Audi had had with Wisconsin reasonably associated it with our state and compelling Audi to stand trial within this state was not violative of due process.
26. Wis. STAT. § 180.801(4) (1975) provides in pertinent part:
(4) Without excluding other activities which may not constitute transacting
business in this state, a foreign corporation shall not be considered to be transacting business in this state, for the purpose of this chapter, by reason of carrying on in this state any one or more of the following activities:
(d) Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through employes or
agents or otherwise, where such orders require acceptance without this state
before becoming binding contracts.
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180.847(4) was proper.
The court also rejected as improper the service made upon
Volkswagen of America. Volkswagen was the designated agent
for Audi for only those limited purposes set forth in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and was not
Audi's agent for the general purpose of service of process in a
state action.
In Stevens v. White Motor Corp.,2 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's finding that the requirements of
the long-arm statute were met. In Stevens, the plaintiff sought
recovery for injuries sustained when an aluminum air pressure
tank, which served as a reservoir for the air brake and starting
system on a truck, exploded as the plaintiff was entering the
cab. The air tank was manufactured by Cutler Metal Products
Company, a New Jersey corporation. Cutler sold the tank to
White Motor Company, the manufacturer of the truck. Cutler
objected to the assertion of jurisdiction over it by the Wisconsin
court.
The facts introduced into evidence indicated that Cutler
had its only manufacturing plant and business office in Camden, New Jersey. In 1971 Cutler employed approximately 220
persons and had gross sales in excess of 4.7 million dollars.
Cutler's major product line was the production of fuel tanks
making up approximately seventy percent of its business. Only
fifteen percent of its trade involved air and hydraulic tanks
similar to the one in issue. Cutler had been selling such tanks
to White since sometime in the 1950's and had sold 476 of the
tanks to White between May of 1967 and May of 1970. Cutler
had never solicited business nor had any direct business relations with any customers located in Wisconsin.
The trial court concluded that Cutler was amenable to jurisdiction pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 262.05(4)(b),
now renumbered 801.05(4)(b). 28 Cutler argued that the statutory prerequisites for jurisdiction under Wisconsin's long-arm
statute had not been met.29 The trial court relied upon the
27. 77 Wis. 2d 64, 252 N.W.2d 88 (1977).
28. See Wis. STAT. § 801.05(4)(b) (1975), supra note 21.
29. The supreme court has consistently recognized that determining whether jurisdiction is proper involves a two-part analysis. It must first be determined that the
statutory prerequisite of the Wisconsin long-arm statute has been met and secondly it
must be determined that the constitutional requirements of due process are satisfied.
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federal court decision of McPhee v. Simonds Saw & Steel Co. 30

in holding that in order to meet the requirements of section
801.05(4)(b) a showing had to be made that more than one
Cutler product had been used in this state in the ordinary
course of trade. Such an interpretation of section 801.05(4)(b)
was approved by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hasley v.
Black, Sivails & Bryson, Inc.31 which was decided while the
appeal in Stevens was pending. Cutler argued that the proof
introduced by the plaintiff was insufficient to prove that more
than one item (the tank which exploded) was used within this
state. Cutler argued that the findings of fact necessary to establish jurisdiction under the statute could not be inferred and
that the Hasley decision mandated a bare minimum finding
that at least two of the defendant's products were present in
Wisconsin.
Cutler argued that although inferences were proper in analyzing whether due process requirements were met, they were
not proper in determining the existence of the statutory prerequisites to jurisdiction. The court rejected the narrow standard
of proof which Cutler proposed, relying upon the general rule
that a trier of fact is not limited to facts directly proven, but
may find any or all of the material facts in the case by drawing
reasonable inferences from facts proven in the record.12 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court found it entirely proper for the trial
court to conclude, in considering the nature of Cutler's component part manufacturing role, that a substantial, though indefinite, number of Cutler products were installed on trucks used
in this state in the ordinary course of trade, and that as a result
Cutler was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin
courts.
In a four to three decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Terry v. Kolski ' held that Wisconsin state courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases based on the Federal Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 34 Terry was a prisoner in
See Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446 (1975);
Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970).
30. 294 F. Supp. 779, 782 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
31. 70 Wis. 2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446 (1975).
32. 77 Wis. 2d at 75, 252 N.W.2d at 94.
33. 78 Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights.
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the Milwaukee County jail who brought a small claims action
in Milwaukee County Court against a deputy sheriff. Terry
alleged that the defendant deprived him of his first amendment rights when he seized and destroyed several magazines
belonging to the plaintiff. Terry's complaint was dismissed by
the county court and the circuit court affirmed on appeal, finding that section 1983 afforded a federal right which could be
vindicated only by a federal remedy in the federal courts. Upon
a rehearing, the circuit court modified its position and held
that a section 1983 action would be cognizable in a state court
but only where it was pendant to a state action."
On appeal, the defendant conceded that a state court would
have concurrent jurisdiction with a federal district court on
actions brought under section 1983, but contended that the
claim was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
small claims branch of county court. The court refused to dispose of the case based on the defendant's concession and dealt
with the issue of concurrent jurisdiction extensively. First,
however, the court summarily rejected defendant's contention
that the subject matter jurisdiction of the small claims court
differed from that of the circuit court:
The small claims court is a part of the county court and
is created by ch. 299, Stats. In all respects it has the same
jurisdiction as the county court generally; but, in respect to
claims amounting to $500 or less, an expedited and summary
procedure is provided. Its subject matter jurisdiction, however, is not limited in any manner pertinent to its authority
to entertain a sec. 1983 action (sec. 299.03, Stats.). In a sec.
1983 action brought for the recovery of money damages of
$500, the small claims procedures are available. 6
Relying upon Article VI, paragraph 231 of the United States
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
35. 78 Wis. 2d at 480, 254 N.W.2d at 705.
36. Id. at 498, 254 N.W.2d at 713.
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides in pertinent part: "This constitution, and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
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Constitution, the majority opinion restates the constitutional
duty of state courts to exercise jurisdiction to enforce federal
causes of action and federal rights, unless such are exclusively
and expressly reserved by Congress to the federal courts." Wisconsin Statutes section 262.04(1), now renumbered 801.04(1),
provides that "Ij]urisdiction of the subject matter is conferred
by the Constitution and statutes of this state and by statutes
of the United States. . . ." The underlying issue was whether
Congress had exclusively reserved jurisdiction to the federal
courts with respect to the enforcement of section 1983 actions.
Title 28, section 1343(3) of the United States Code provides
that the federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction
over any civil action authorized by law to "redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, . . . of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution. . . or by any Act of
13 9
Congress.
Justice Heffernan, in the majority decision, relying upon
Monroe v. Pape,4" states that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 is a verbatim codification of Revised Statutes section 1979. The majority
opinion points out that section 1983 was originally enacted as
part of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866. 4' As originally
enacted, the federal district courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide such claims.4 2 In 1871, the act was
amended and the language with respect to the exclusive nature
of the federal court's jurisdiction was replaced with the following: "such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district
or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies
provided in like cases. in such courts . . .-.
In 1874, Congress attempted the first revised and codified
statement of the laws of the United States. Congress enacted
by the Act of June 22, 1874,14 the Revised Statutes of the
38. See Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367
(1976); Vogt v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 2d 125, 230 N.W.2d 123 (1975).
39. The fact that section 1343(3) provides that the district courts shall have
"original jurisdiction" is not to be equated with an express grant of exclusive jurisdiction but rather evidences a contrary intent on the part of Congress. See Bors v. Preston,
111 U.S. 252 (1884); Brown v. Pitchess, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204, 531 P.2d 772 (1975).
40. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
41. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27.
42. Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
43. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
44. Ch. 333, § 2, 18 Stat. 113.
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United States, which were declared to be legal evidence of the
law and to repeal any public act passed prior to December 1,
1873.I The 1874 revision affirmatively enacted section 1979
which, according to the majority, represents verbatim the current section 1983. Simultaneously to the enactment of Revised
Statutes section 1979, the Congress enacted sections 563 and
629, which provided that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over such suits.
The majority opinion thus concludes that the earlier statutes which provided for exclusive jurisdiction were repealed by
the codification of 1874 and recreated by the enactment of Title
XIH, sections 563 and 629, and Title XXIV, section 1979, Laws
of 1874.41
The minority opinion argues that the 1874 revision was no
more than an abbreviation of the Revised Act of 1871, and that
"it cannot be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such an
intent [was] clearly expressed."47 In addition, the minority
opinion argues that the 1871 revision did not alter the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal district courts since the introduction of
appeal rights and other remedies makes "sense only if the action is required to be commenced in the federal system.""
Thus, the minority found that Congress created a federal right
and reserved exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of that
right to the federal courts and that the state courts would not
have concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 cases.49
Subject to an appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the Terry decision absorbs into the substantive law of this state
the large body of federal case law surrounding section 1983 of
the United States Code. Consequently, the Terry decision will
have a broad impact upon the protection of constitutionally
protected rights in Wisconsin. For example, one author has
45. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 36.19, at 79-80 (rev. 3rd ed.).
46. 78 Wis. 2d at 490, 254 N.W.2d at 107 (1977).
47. Id. at 503, 254 N.W.2d at 704.
48. Id.
49. Both the majority and minority opinions refer to a footnote found in a dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36 n. 17 (1976) in
which he stated: "The Court today appears to divide sub silentio a hitherto unresolved
question by implying that § 1983 claims are not claims exclusively cognizable in federal
court. . . ." The majority finds implicit in this statement authority for their decision
to allow section 1983 actions in state courts. The dissenting opinion rejects this "search
for the implicit" since in their words it "too easily leads to locating what is not there."
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recently suggested that the decision may nullify some immunities granted to governmental bodies pursuant to section
895.43(3) with respect to their liability for the intentional torts
of their agents and employees since state created immunities
have been held in federal court to give way to the enforcement
of section 1983.50
MICHAEL J JASSAK

COMMERCIAL LAW
I.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS-PRIORITIES

In House of Stainless v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered for the first time the effect
of a perfected security interest containing an after-acquired
property clause on a seller's right pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 402.702(2)2 to reclaim property sold on credit to a
buyer who was insolvent when the property was received.
Marshall & EIsley Bank (M&I) had entered into a security
agreement with Alkar Engineering on November 1, 1971 providing for a security interest in Alkar's inventory both presently owned and after-acquired. M&I also properly perfected
the security interest.3 House of Stainless Steel, Inc. (Stainless)
delivered goods to Alkar on credit in January, 1973. Stainless
discovered that Alkar had received this shipment of goods
while insolvent and accordingly Stainless made a written demand for the return of the goods from Alkar. This demand
satisfied Wisconsin Statutes section 402.702(2), as it was properly made within ten days of the receipt of the goods by Alkar.
In spite of the fact that on January 17, 1973, Stainless had
given notice of this demand to M&I, the bank, acting pursuant
to the after-acquired property clause in its security agreement
with Alkar, sold the goods that Stainless was attempting to
50. Fine, Several Police Supervisor Immunities From State Court Suit May Be
Doomed By the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 50 Wis. B. BULL., Oct. 1977, 9-12.
1. 75 Wis. 2d 264, 249 N.W.2d 561 (1977).
2. Wis. STAT. § 402.702(2) (1971) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Where
the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may
"
reclaim the goods upon dei.iand made within 10 days after the receipt
3. 75 Wis. 2d at 265, 249 N.W.2d at 562.

